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Material Lives: Amending the False
Claims Act to Restore Qui Tam
Medicaid Enforcement and Protect Our
Most Vulnerable Communities
C. Deen*
Abstract
In 2016, the Supreme Court granted cert. in Universal Health
Services, Inc. v United States ex rel. Escobar to resolve a circuit
split on implied certification under the False Claims Act. The
Court’s opinion also addressed the issue of materiality under the
False Claims Act. The “rigorous standard” expounded by the Court
raised the standard of materiality beyond simple contractual or
regulatory noncompliance. This heightened standard represents a
significant departure from previous jurisprudence. Moreover, the
heightened standard frustrates the repeatedly expressed will of
Congress to empower qui tam whistleblowers to prosecute fraud
perpetrated on the government. The primary focus of this Note is
the effect this new materiality standard will have on Medicaid qui
tam actions. This Note proposes that post-Escobar Congress should
amend the False Claims Act’s materiality definition to return the
act to the original intention of its drafters. This will allow potential
Medicaid fraud perpetrators to again fully face the threat of qui tam
enforcement envisioned by Congress, preventing potentially
disastrous effects on the United States’ most vulnerable
communities.

* J.D. Candidate, 2021. This Note is dedicated to the memory of Yaruska Rivera,
the young woman whose life and needless death are more than case facts. My
personal thanks are extended to Professor Brandon Hasbrouck for the invaluable
input, guidance, and mentorship that made this Note possible as well as the
countless educators, friends, and family for their support over the years.

273

274

27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 273 (2020)

Table of Contents
I. Introduction................................................................................ 275
II. The History of the False Claims Act....................................... 278
A. How Guns That Don’t Shoot Became Doctors That Don’t
Care in Today’s False Claims Act ............................................. 280
B. The Text of the False Claims Act Today ............................. 282
III. Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Escobar ........................................................................................... 285
A. The Case ................................................................................. 285
B. The Supreme Court’s Opinion .............................................. 286
IV. The Current State of the Qui Tam Suit Post-Escobar ......... 288
A. Immediate Reaction in the Legal Sector ............................. 289
B. In the Courts .......................................................................... 291
1. Heightened Materiality Requirements in the False Claims
Act have a Particularly Strong Effect Coupled with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) ................................................... 291
2. The Reality in the Courtroom is Routine Summary
Dismissal ................................................................................. 292
3. The Supreme Court Has Refused to Clarify the Escobar
Standard .................................................................................. 295
V. The Need for Qui Tam-False Claims Act Oversight in Medicaid
........................................................................................................ 295
A. The Government is Incapable of Adequately Prosecuting or
Even Estimating Fraud in Medicaid ........................................ 296
VI. Medicaid Fraud Inherently Affects and Disadvantages the
Most Vulnerable Communities .................................................... 300
A. Demographic Overviews Reveal Minorities and Disabled
Individuals Are Disproportionately Affected ........................... 300
B. Medicaid Fraud Creates Acute Standard of Care Issues
Which Can Kill or Injure the Very Beneficiaries Medicaid is
Supposed to Save ....................................................................... 302

275

MATERIAL LIVES

C. Medicaid Fraud Has a Chronic, Systemic Impact Which
Imperils Even Those Medicaid Beneficiaries Receiving Proper
Care ............................................................................................. 305
VII. Resurrecting the False Claims Act’s Qui Tam Provision to
Combat Medicaid Fraud ............................................................... 306
A. The Status Quo Precludes an Adequate General Judicial
Framework of FCA Materiality ................................................ 307
B. A Statutory Amendment Will Allow for Reliable and
Accurate Materiality Determinations in FCA Suits ............... 310
C. The Clear Results of the Proposal’s Effect on a Hypothetical
FCA Suit ..................................................................................... 313
VIII. Conclusion............................................................................. 315

“If ever we are ever justified in reading a statute, not narrowly as
through a keyhole, but in the broad light of the evils it aimed at
and the good it hoped for, it is here.”1
I. Introduction
Medicaid was created in 1965 as a joint program with state
governments to provide health care to groups identified by the
federal government as the country’s most vulnerable.2 Over 100
years prior to that enactment, the False Claims Act (FCA) was
passed in the midst of the Civil War to combat procurement fraud
in the war to end slavery.3 The FCA creates a statutory regime for
holding fraudulent actors civilly liable in their dealings with the
federal government.4 These two disparate sections of the law—
1. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 557 (1943) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
2. See Medicaid.gov: Keeping America Healthy, CTRS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://www.medicaid.gov/about-us/programhistory/index.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2020) (explaining the origins and
purpose behind Medicaid) [perma.cc/B39N-SPMG].
3. See infra Part II (discussing the foundations of the FCA).
4. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2018) (providing for civil damages for false
claims and establishing the procedure involved in actions under the FCA).
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their creation separated by over a century—have come together to
result in billions of civil settlements and judgments every year to
recover government funds and dissuade would-be bad actors in
government-funded medical care.5 The FCA cases currently being
brought throughout the United States overwhelmingly concern
healthcare fraud in the systems designed to serve communities
that would otherwise be denied healthcare entirely.6 The intent of
Congress to reorient the FCA from guns that do not shoot to
doctors that do not care is clear after repeated amendments to the
act.7
This Note first explores the history of the FCA and the
contentious relationship between the legislative demand for a
statute exacting accountability and the judiciary’s strictly
textualist and originalist reading of it.8 This contentious
relationship has also resulted in a constant, evolving reorientation
of the FCA to ensure the empowerment of private individuals—qui
tam relators—with the authority to serve as private attorneys
general where fraud is being perpetrated on the government.9
The most recent salvo in this 150-plus-year argument is the
Supreme Court’s decision in Universal Health Services v. United
States ex rel. Escobar.10 The Court expounded upon materiality
under the False Claims Act as a demanding standard that requires
a holistic approach that goes beyond even express contractual
terms.11 The opinion will be discussed in greater detail below, but
as an introductory matter, it should be noted that the reasoning of
the Court explicitly embraces a strict textualist reading and
5. See infra Subpart II.A (discussing the interaction between the FCA and
government funded medical care).
6. See infra Part V (illustrating the majority of FCA cases concern
Department of Health and Human Services program).
7. See infra Subpart II.A (exploring the amendment history of the FCA
specifically in the 1986 and Affordable Care Act amendments).
8. See infra Subpart II.A (documenting the back-and-forth battle between
Congress and the courts).
9. See infra Subpart II.B (pointing to Congress’ repeated revision when
Courts acted to limit the FCA’s qui tam provision).
10. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.
Ct. 1989, 2003–04 (2016) (holding that materiality under the act is derived from
demanding common law antecedents).
11. See id. at 2002–04 (detailing the materiality standard proscribed the
Court to the FCA).
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originalist view of contract law derived from English common law
sources.12
This Note examines the impact of Escobar’s demanding
materiality standards both in the government contracts legal
community generally and in courts hearing Medicaid qui tam suits
specifically.13 The reception of the legal community outside of the
courts is an important aspect of the issue given that the legal
community will shape proactive compliance in the Medicaid
provider community. The application of the materiality standard
by courts will only serve as an effective tool where it serves as a
deterrence for future harms; the reaction of the legal sector shapes
compliance which may save lives rather than simply monetarily
punish the providers who take them.14
The reality of this standard’s effect is illuminated within this
Note by attempting to—inherently limited by inadequate
government data collection—examine the issues of fraud and
quality of care in Medicaid. The limitations on accurately
estimating Medicaid fraud are explained through the
government’s own testimony. 15 The approach to illuminate the
dangers of inadequate Medicaid fraud documentation and
prosecution is made more whole by examining how the groups who
benefit—and therefore suffer when defrauded—the most from the
program are our country’s most vulnerable communities.16 The
direct danger of inadequate Medicaid fraud prosecution will be
faced not by Congressional appropriations but by communities
already pushed to the margins of society.17
12. See id. at 1999 (starting the analysis with the statute’s language and
incorporating “well-settled meaning of common-law terms”).
13. See infra Subpart IV.A and Section IV.B.2 (examining the reaction to the
Escobar standard by the legal community and the application of the standard in
lower courts).
14. See e.g. John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty
on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965–1003 (June 1984)
(discussing in part the incentivization of undercompliance in sectors with unclear
legal standards).
15. See infra Subpart V.A (examining the government’s inability to quantify
the extent of Medicaid fraud).
16. See Medicaid.gov: Keeping America Healthy, supra note 2 (explaining
the purpose of Medicaid is to provide “coverage for the poorest Americans”).
17. See id. (explaining the purpose of Medicaid is to provide “coverage for the
poorest Americans”).
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Finally, this Note proposes that given the statutory tools
according to the Court in Escobar, the history of the False Claims
Act, and the realities to be faced by vulnerable communities, the
only option left is for statutory amendment. The reality that the
act covers far more than Medicaid fraud is faced and—what the
author hopes is—a novel solution is proposed that will respect that
reality while empowering the Act once again to preserve and
protect a program which serves as a cornerstone of the Great
Society Reforms which sought to help bring racial and social justice
in to the American reality.18
II. The History of the False Claims Act
The False Claims Act was signed in to law by President
Abraham Lincoln in 1863 “to combat rampant fraud in Civil War
defense contracts.”19 The statute originally provided for both civil
and criminal penalties with a civil penalty of $2,000 per claim and
double damages.20 Despite the context of the Act’s passage, the Act
did not specify defense contracts but applied to “any Government
agency or instrumentability, quasi-governmental corporation, or
nonappropriated fund activity.”21 The Act was
[I]ntended to protect the treasury against the hungry and
unscrupulous host that encompasses it on every side, and
should be construed accordingly. It was passed upon the
theory . . . that one of the least expensive and most effective
means of preventing frauds . . . [is] the strong stimulus of
personal ill will or the hope of gain.22

Critically, the FCA allowed private citizens—known as
relators—to pursue fraudulent activity in stating that “[a suit]
may be brought and carried on by any person, as well for himself
18. See generally Lyndon B. Johnson, President of United States of America,
Commencement Address at the University of Michigan: The Great Society (May
22, 1964).
19. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986).
20. See id. (“The civil penalty provided for payment of double the amount of
damages . . . plus a $2,000 forfeiture for each claim submitted.”).
21. Id. at 10.
22. United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885) (holding the
purpose of the FCA to be construed broadly over all government fraud).
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as for the United States.” 23 These private citizens were
incentivized by an accompanying provision allowing a relator to
collect half of the damages recovered in the action, as well as their
costs, if they pursued the suit until final judgment.24 The action
brought by the relator originally belonged to the relator alone
without any allowance for government intervention.25 Courts went
so far in this regard that they viewed the action as a property right
which could not be divested from the relator even if the
government attempted to settle.26
The relator provision is known as qui tam from its Latin name
in the common law: qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in
hac part sequitur.27 The history of qui tam provisions in the United
States legal system traces back to the First Continental
Congress.28 The concept of qui tam itself was an element part of
the common law before the founding of the United States and its
nature was well understood by both the Founding Fathers and the
drafters of the original False Claims Act.29 It was accepted that in
executing a qui tam action the relator was acting in the public
interest as it “would otherwise be advanced by public officials.”30
The qui tam provision of the Act was intended by the drafters to be

23. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 10 (1986) (citations omitted).
24. See id. (“[T]he private relator who prosecuted the case to final judgment
would be entitled to one half of the damages and forfeitures recovered and
collected. If successful, the relator would also be entitled to an award of his
costs.”).
25. See id. (describing a relator’s rights in a qui tam action at the time of the
1863 drafting).
26. See United States v. Griswold, 30 F. 762, 763 (D. Or. 1887) (holding the
prosecution of a qui tam action to be a property right).
27. See Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(translating the original Latin as: who as well for the king as for himself sues in
this matter).
28. See, e.g., Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336, 341 (1805) (“Almost every fine or
forfeiture under a penal statute, may be recovered by an action of debt [by a qui
tam plaintiff] as well as by information [by a public prosecutor].”).
29. See BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144, *160–61 (“defining the qui tam
action in English Common law.”).
30. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of
Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 551 (2000) (introducing the changes of
the 1986 amendments to the FCA).
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key to the efficacy of the act in order to encourage participants in
fraud to bring forward the fraud themselves.31
A. How Guns That Don’t Shoot Became Doctors That Don’t Care
in Today’s False Claims Act
In early years of World War II, a number of “qui tam actions
were brought regarding World War II defense procurement
fraud.”32 Controversy arose because relators were court watchers
initiating qui tam suits based solely on the details of criminal fraud
indictments launched by the Federal government without any
personal knowledge.33 In Marcus v. Hess,34 “the Government
contended that an action brought by an informer who based his
civil action on a criminal indictment should be barred.”35 There,
the Court refused the government’s invitation to read a personal
knowledge requirement into the Act.36 The Court’s opinion drove
the Attorney General—who had aggressively been criminally
prosecuting procurement fraud—to ask Congress to remove the qui
tam provisions from the Act entirely.37 After nearly acquiescing,
Congress refused the Attorney General’s request.38 It did, however,
amend the plain language of the statute to remove a court’s
jurisdiction over qui tam civil actions when the government was

31. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955–56 (1863) (statement of Sen.
Howard) (defending the efficacy of the qui tam provision in the proposed FCA).
32. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 10 (1986).
33. See id. at 10–11 (detailing the controversy surrounding World War II qui
tam suits).
34. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 (1943) (holding
the statute did not bar civil qui tam actions based on criminal complaints).
35. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 10 (1986).
36. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. at 545 (“Even if, as
the government suggests, the petitioner has contributed nothing to the discovery
of this crime, he has contributed much to accomplishing one of the purposes for
which the Act was passed.”).
37. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 11(1986) (“The Marvus [sic] v. Hess decision
prompted then Attorney General Francis Biddle to request that Congress repeal
the qui tam provisions of the act).
38. See id. (describing the process of compromise between the House and
Senate to retain a limited qui tam provision).
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already knowledgeable and the relator was not the original
source.39
Court’s responded to the change in the statute with
considerable textual discipline and barred a number of qui tam
actions in the decades to come.40 The status quo on qui tam actions
finally began to crack in 1984 when the state of Wisconsin
attempted to file a qui tam action alleging massive Medicaid fraud
where the state had already disclosed and the Federal government
failed to act on the information.41 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that despite the Federal government’s inaction, the
state was barred from bringing the suit having already disclosed
the information to the Federal government.42 After the decision,
the negative reaction was swift—resulting in both a condemnation
from the National Association of Attorneys General and a
bipartisan effort to introduce reforms which would encourage qui
tam suits.43
Congress amended the Act in 1986 in a number of ways
including increased penalties, removal of specific intent to defraud,
and imposing liability based on reckless disregard for the truth in
claims submitted to the government.44 Critically, the 1986
amendment also abrogated the language the courts had used to bar
many qui tam suits since 1943 by creating standing again for
relators submitting information already possessed by the
government unless it had already been publicly disclosed. 45 The
1986 amendment further encourages qui tam relators by
guaranteeing costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees, and between 15–30%
39. See id. at 8 (summarizing the 1943 amendment to the FCA).
40. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lapin v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 490 F.
Supp. 244, 248 (D. Haw. 1980) (holding a relator suit disqualified despite a lack
of government action to correct the fraud).
41. See United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1103–04 (7th
Cir. 1984) (holding the public disclosure bar in the statute removed the Court’s
jurisdiction).
42. See id. at 1104 (finding the plain text of the statute indicates a broad
jurisdictional bar).
43. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 10 (detailing the reaction by June of 1984 after
the Seventh’s Circuit decision in March of the same year).
44. See Beck supra note 30, at 562 (introducing the changes of the 1986
amendments to the FCA).
45. See id. at 562–63 (detailing the differences between the 1943 and 1986
FCA amendments and their justifications).
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of the recovery.46 The final change in the 1986 amendment was to
allow relators to continue as named parties—and beneficiaries—
even if the government did intervene in prosecuting the suit.47 The
changes decentralized government fraud prosecution creating
greater access to information for the government; increasing the
likelihood of prosecution compared to prosecution by the
Department of Justice alone (DOJ); and, increasing the incentives
for whistleblowers to expose fraud.48
B. The Text of the False Claims Act Today
By 2009 the changes of the 1986 Amendments to the FCA had
resulted in $22 billion in recoveries for the Federal government.49
In 2009, however, the Supreme Court read the FCA narrowly to
bar suits where fraudulent intent was not present.50 This decision
was met with a swift reaction from Congress who considered the
decision “contrary to the clear language and congressional intent
of the FCA.”51 The Fraud and Enforcement and Recovery Act of
2009 (FERA) was largely aimed at combatting the mortgage fraud
leading to the Great Recession of 2008.52 Congress felt compelled
to revise the False Claims Act in its battle against fraud
generally.53 “The effectiveness of the False Claims Act has recently
46. See id. at 562 (explaining that the statute directs a two-tier range for
relator’s recovery of 15% to 25% if the government and intervenes and 25% to 30%
if they do not).
47. See id. (“Even if the Justice Department does intervene, the informer can
continue as a party.”).
48. See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring
Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1823–34 (1996)
(summarizing the effects of the 1986 amendments).
49. See Michael A. Morse & Peter S. Wolff, Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act of 2009 Strengthens Federal FCA, LAWS. J., June 19, 2009, at 5, 10 (“The FCA
is widely regarded as the most effective tool in combating fraud against the
federal government, resulting in over $22 billion in recoveries since 1986.”).
50. See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662,
668–69 (2008) (holding that the language “to get” then present in 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(2) is an intent requirement).
51. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009).
52. See id. at 2–4 (describing the context of the financial crisis and the
purpose of the act to combat it).
53. See id. at 4 (“This legislation also makes a number of important
improvements to fraud and money laundering statutes to strengthen prosecutors'
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been undermined by court decisions . . . . The False Claims Act
must be corrected and clarified in order to protect from the fraud
the Federal assistance and relief funds expended in response to our
current economic crisis.”54 Congress clearly intended the False
Claims Act to be actively used and sought to overrule the
weakening of the Act from the Court’s decision in Allison Engine
Co.55 The Justice Department agreed that revision to the Act was
necessary to “aggressively fight fraud in the current economic
climate.”56 The 2009 bill’s amendments to the Act were intended to
encourage qui tam suits to pursue government fraud generally.57
Congress amended the Act only a year after FERA when
amendments were passed as part of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010.58 Congress’s concerns for
potential fraud in the medical payment systems within the ACA
were largely borne out of the decades of experience the Federal
government had in pursuing Medicaid and Medicare fraud.59
Congress was careful to point out within the ACA that any
payments made “by, through, or in connection with an Exchange
are subject to the False Claims Act.”60
Congress was largely responding to the strict application and
narrowing of the statute by the Supreme Court in Graham County
Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel. Wilson.61
ability to combat this growing wave of fraud.”).
54. Id. at 4.
55. See id. at 10–11 (“[T]he Allison Engine decision[] runs contrary to the
clear language and congressional intent of the FCA . . . .”).
56. Id. at 9 (internal citation omitted).
57. See Charles T. Kirchmaier, Treating the Symptoms but Not the Disease:
A Call to Reform False Claims Act Enforcement, 209 MIL. L. Rev. 186, 217–20
(2011) (explaining the effect of the 2009 proposed amendments and their effect of
promoting litigation “as a primary remedy”).
58. The False Claims Act was specifically amended in anticipation of
increased government healthcare contracts. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, 901–02
(2010) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012)).
59. See Lewis Morris, Perspective, Combating Fraud in Health Care: An
Essential Component of Any Cost Containment Strategy, HEALTH AFFAIRS,
Sept./Oct. 2009, at 1352 (discussing federal fraud-control efforts to combat
Medicare and Medicaid fraud).
60. Pub L. No. 111-148 at 185.
61. See Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex
rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 291 (2010) (holding administrative reports, hearings,
audits, and investigations at the federal, state, and local levels all constituted
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In order to weaponize the False Claims Act against potential ACA
fraud, Congress passed an amendment that substantially altered
the public disclosure requirements introduced in the
Congressional compromise of the 1943 amendments. 62 The ACA
amendment also provided that the government had the right to
oppose dismissal of the action if the court found that the qui tam
suit was based on public disclosure.63 The ACA amendment
“effectively gutted the Court’s Graham County ruling” by
redefining public disclosure to mean only the news media, federal
materials, and federal proceedings in which the government was a
party.64 Finally, the ACA modified the original source doctrine to
allow relators to bring suits where they had no direct knowledge
but still “materially adds” to the public disclosure.65 The last
provision, removing the jurisdictional bar for relators based on
public disclosures, has had a surprising reception from the
courts.66 The requirement was intended by Congress to ease the
burden for relators to qualify as an original source; however, courts
have instead used the language to impose a heightened standard
for relators to establish standing in a qui tam suit.67

sources for disqualifying public disclosure under the False Claims Act).
62. See Brett W. Barnett & Jason S. Greis, False Claim Act Litigation under
the Affordable Care Act, GPSOLO, Mar./Apr. 2015 at 24 (“Prior to the ACA, the
public disclosure bar served as one of the strongest and quickest ways to dismiss
a false claims action.”).
63. See id. (“[U]nder the ACA the government is given the opportunity to
oppose dismissal owing to public disclosure.”).
64. See id. (“[T]he statute now clarifies that public disclosure sources are
limited to federal criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings in which the
government is a party; federal reports, hearings, audits, and investigations; and
news media.”).
65. See id. at 25 (“The ACA, however, eliminated the “direct” knowledge
requirement, and now a relator can qualify as an “original source” so long as a
relator has independent knowledge that “materially adds” to the publicly
disclosed allegations.”).
66. See id. (“[C]ourts thus far have imposed a somewhat heightened
standard for relators.”).
67. See id. (“Although the ‘materially adds’ requirement was apparently
intended to ease the requirements for qualifying as an ‘original source,’ courts
thus far have imposed a somewhat heightened standard for relators.”) (citations
omitted).
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III. Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Escobar

This Note approaches the Supreme Court’s decision in a
contextual manner. The case is grounded first in the facts which
gave rise to the Court’s decision so that the reader might approach
the case from the same social justice focus which is the focus of this
scholarship. The legal reasoning and conclusions of the Court
should not be divorced from the facts of the particular case as it
sheds immediate light on the implications of the decision in the
context of Medicaid fraud. Special emphasis is, however, paid to
the interpretive tools used by the Court to help frame why the
statutory amendment proposal later in the Note is necessary.
A. The Case
Yarushka Rivera was 12 years old when she began receiving
mental health treatment from Arbour Counseling Services in
Lawrence, Massachusetts—owned by Universal Health Services—
through Massachusetts’ Medicaid program in 2004.68 In 2009, at
the age of 17, Yarushka suffered an adverse reaction to medication
prescribed for a bipolar disorder diagnosis she received at the
facility.69 After multiple seizures, she died in October of that year.70
After her death a counselor at the facility revealed to her parents
that few of the employees at the facility were actually licensed.71
The “psychiatrist” who diagnosed her received a “Ph.D” from an
unaccredited internet college, and Massachusetts rejected her
application for a medical license.72 The “psychiatrist” who
prescribed the medication that led to her death was a nurse with
68. See id. at 1997 (describing the course of treatment Yarushka Rivera
received).
69. See id. (“Yarushka had an adverse reaction to a medication that a
purported doctor at Arbour prescribed . . . she suffered another seizure and
died.”).
70. See id. (detailing repeated medically significant seizures).
71. See id. (“[O]f the five professionals who had treated Yarushka, only one
was properly licensed.”).
72. See id. (“[F]ailed to mention that her degree came from an unaccredited
Internet college and that Massachusetts had rejected her application to be
licensed.”).
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no prescription authority. Of the five Arbour employees who
treated Yarushka, only one was licensed.73
The employees at Arbour had not just lied to Yarushka’s
parents, they fraudulently represented themselves “to the Federal
Government to obtain individual National Provider Identification
numbers, which are submitted in connection with Medicaid
reimbursement claims.”74 Yarushka’s stepfather—Julio Escobar—
initially reported the facility to various authorities before he filed
a qui tam suit in federal court based on misrepresentations to
Medicaid of Arbour’s “unqualified, unlicensed, and unsupervised
staff.”75 The District Court granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss on the basis that none of the violations was “a condition of
payment.”76 The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit reversed and remanded the decision based on the lower
court’s error to consider that the Medicaid regulations were
material.77 The District Court then found for the United States and
was affirmed by the First Circuit on appeal by Universal Health
Services on the basis that regulatory conditions of payment were
sufficient as “constitut[ing] dispositive evidence of materiality”.78
B. The Supreme Court’s Opinion
The opinion of the Court begins with using a “settled principle”
of statutory interpretation that absent a statutory definition
within the False Claims Act Congress must have incorporated the
meaning of the terms according to the common law to resolve the
circuit split on implied certification.79 The Court reasons that
73. See id. (explaining the depth of licensure fraud at the clinic).
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1997–98 (explaining that respondents filed the action after
discovering that “few Arbour employees were actually licensed to provide mental
health counseling and that supervision of them was minimal”).
76. United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., 2014 WL
1271757, *1, *6–12 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014).
77. See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., 780 F.3d
504, 513 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding regulatory provisions to be dispositive of
materiality) (citations omitted).
78. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989, 1998 (2016).
79. See id. at 1999 (“Congress did not define what makes a claim ‘false’ or
‘fraudulent.’ But ‘[i]t is a settled principle of interpretation that, absent other
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incorporating the common law definition means “that the implied
false certification theory can, at least in some circumstances,
provide a basis for liability” under the Act.80 The heightened
requirement imported from the common law, however, led the
Court to restrict the application of implied certification where “the
claim does not merely request payment, but also makes specific
representations about the good or services . . . [and] the
defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements makes those
representations misleading half-truths.”81
The second question, however, is whether a defendant who
fails to disclose a violation of a contractual, statutory, or regulatory
provision only creates liability when that provision is expressly
designated a condition of payment.82 The Court finds no basis for
this limitation in the text but finds within this question an implicit
consideration of the materiality standard of the Act.83 The Court
categorizes the materiality simply as “look[ing] to the effect on the
likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged
misrepresentation.”84 The Court does not mince its words when it
explains the effect: “The materiality standard is demanding.”85
How demanding is the heightened materiality standard in
application? In the Court’s approach “when evaluating materiality
under the False Claims Act, the Government’s decision to expressly
identify a provision as a condition of payment is relevant, but not
automatically dispositive.” 86 Rather remarkably, this means even
if the government expressly designates a condition for payment,
that will not impose liability on its own. The Court explicitly rejects
automatic materiality even when “the defendant knows that the
indication, Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the
common-law terms it uses.’” (quoting Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 732
(2013))).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2001 (emphasis added).
82. See id. (explaining the question of whether express provision constitutes
materiality).
83. See id. (“Nothing in the text of the False Claims Act supports [materiality
by express provisions].”).
84. Id. at 2002 (citing 26 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 69:12, p. 549 (4th
ed. 2003)).
85. Id. at 2003.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
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Government would be entitled to refuse payment were it aware of
the violation.”87 “The False Claims Act does not adopt such an
extraordinarily expansive view of materiality.”88 The Court offers
only two citations as examples of materiality: lying about collusive
bidding and real property title misrepresentations.89 On this
heightened standard of materiality—which the First Circuit had
not applied—the lower court’s finding of adequately pled fraud was
vacated.90
IV. The Current State of the Qui Tam Suit Post-Escobar
This section is explored in roughly chronological order. It
begins with a survey of the reaction of the legal community to the
materiality standard. The legal community’s response is focused
primarily on the lawyers who both represent FCA plaintiffs and
the defense bar.91 The motivation for this approach is based on the
idea that it is the practicing legal community that will analyze the
standards and shape compliance efforts initially.92 These proactive
compliance efforts have the potential to save lives within the
context of medical practices.93 The Note then moves on to survey
lower court decisions applying the Escobar standard after
clarifying the common procedural posture of initial motions to
dismiss under the heightened fraud pleading standard imposed by
the federal rules.94 Finally, a brief update is provided on requests

87. Id. at 2004.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 2003 (citing as examples Junius Cons. Co. v. Cohen 257 N.Y.
393 (1931) and United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess 317 U.S. 537 (1943)).
90. See id. at 2004 (“Because both opinions below assessed respondents'
complaint based on interpretations of § 3729(a)(1)(A) that differ from ours, we
vacate the First Circuit's judgment and remand the case for reconsideration of
whether respondents have sufficiently pleaded a False Claims Act violation.”).
91. See infra Section IV.A (discussing the legal community’s response to the
materiality requirement).
92. See infra Section IV.A (discussing the legal community’s response to the
materiality requirement).
93. See infra Section IV.A (discussing the effect heightened materiality
requirement).
94. See infra Section IV.B.2 (explaining the impact of the application of the
Escobar standard in lower courts).
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for the Supreme Court to offer clarification of a standard applied
divergently across the various federal courts of appeal.

A. Immediate Reaction in the Legal Sector
The legal community expressed uncertainty regarding the
impact of the heightened materiality standard.95 The new
materiality standard was seen as “possibly the most significant
impact of the Supreme Court decision” as a “higher standard” that
would require the government to “develop evidence of its past
payment practices.”96 Immediately the legal community recognized
that “continued payment of claims by the government will provide
for a materiality defense.”97
Other government contract legal scholars asserted “the
[C]ourt actually restricted the FCA’s potential scope through a
rigorous and demanding standard of ‘materiality.’”98 The impact
was expected to provide “protection against an overly zealous
interpretation of the FCA.”99 Indeed some commentators went so
far as to assert:
FCA plaintiffs would be well-advised to recognize that even if a
trial court ignores the Court’s holding and applies a
less-rigorous pleading standard [on materiality], they face a
protracted and expensive litigation only to revisit the issue on
summary judgment and, if necessary, where the circuit courts
of appeal are far more likely to apply the Court’s test.100

95. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Howell, Rough Road Ahead for Businesses?—The
Impact of The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Universal Health Services, Inc. v.
United States ex. rel. Escobar, 19 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 97, 114 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme
Court also implemented a heightened materiality standard. The decision did not
provide a bright-line rule; therefore, courts will need to adjust to the adoption of
a subjective materiality standard.”).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 115.
98. Robyn N. Burrows, The Supreme Court Uphold Implied Certification
Under the False Claims Act but Imposes “Rigorous Materiality” Standard,
FIDELITY & SURETY L. COMMITTEE NEWSL., Fall 2016, at 10.
99. Id.
100. David L Douglass, Defending FCA Claims: Making the FCA Plaintiff
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The commentator even provided a sample letter to send to a
relator’s counsel advising “it is all too often true that it is one thing
to accuse but a different thing to prove” and “[w]e look forward to
seeking judicial assistance in resolving this matter; should that
become necessary.”101
Simply put, lawyers representing defendants in frequent
False Claims Act litigation regarded the heightened materiality
standard as “welcome news for contractors.”102 These litigators
noted that it was not simply continued payment but also that
“[g]overnment inaction in the face of noncompliance affords
contractors a strong materiality defense.”103 The added emphasis
on materiality and the Court’s own admission that the standard
was not too fact intensive in note 6 of page 2004 of the opinion had
“made its mark on FCA motions practice” and when it came to
dismissal or summary judgment, “courts have shown a willingness
to do just that.”104 The added emphasis on materiality motion
practice leads many practitioners to posit that defendants “must
focus [their] efforts on the discovery and presentation of evidence
of materiality [by the relator].”105
The reception was not entirely positive. Government
practitioners prosecuting fraud under the False Claims Act
detected the potential for a materiality defense just as quickly as
defense counsel.106 These lawyers pointed out that potential for
liability under the Act was of great societal importance given the
number of elderly receiving elderly care services through
Walk the Talk, FED. LAW., Dec. 2016, at 62.
101. Id. at 59.
102. Brian Tully McLaughlin & Jason M. Crawford, Feature Comment,
Materiality Rules! Escobar Changes the Game, GOV’T CONTRACTOR, May 10, 2017,
¶ 135, 2.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. G. Christian Roux & John. D. Hanover, Implied False Certification
Liability Under The False Claims Act: How The Materiality Standard Offers
Protection After Escobar, 38 WTR CONSTR. L. 16, 21 (2018).
106. See Susan Carney Lynch & Ellen Bowden McIntyre, Seeking Justice:
The Department Of Justice's Civil And Criminal Tools And Strategies To Bring
To Justice Nursing Homes Who Provide Grossly Substandard Care To Our
Nation's Elderly Residents, 66 DOJ J. FED. L. & PRAC. 113, 121–22 (2018)
(“Defense attorneys may also claim that the government continued to pay claims
despite negative survey findings and, therefore, the FCA's materiality element
cannot be met.”).
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Medicare.107 Legal scholars also noted that the Court’s holding on
materiality “rejected the position of the majority of circuits” in
designating express regulatory compliance requirements to be
prima facie evidence of materiality.108 The heightened materiality
standard was generally regarded as a “shift away from the
statutory ‘natural tendency’ standard . . . [and] toward a
materiality standard that requires evidence that the government
was in fact influenced.”109 Scholars further asserted that the Court
created confusion in these limited examples by “not go[ing] far
enough in providing sufficient details about liability that may lie
between guns that do not shoot and foreign-made staplers.”110
B. In the Courts
1. Heightened Materiality Requirements in the False Claims Act
have a Particularly Strong Effect Coupled with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b)
The heightened materiality standard imposed by the Supreme
Court in Escobar has a particularly powerful effect in pleadings.
The Federal Rules specify “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake.”111 Courts have been flexible in allowing amendments
to the initial pleadings given the natural information asymmetry
107. See Michael S. Macko & Bianca Valcarce, Using the False Claims Act To
Combat Fraud By Personal Care Homes, 66 DOJ J. FED. L. & PRAC. 129, 136
(“Residents of personal care homes depend on their caregivers to provide
necessities and assistance for their everyday lives . . . residents can be vulnerable
to abuse and neglect . . . traditional criminal remedies might be the first response,
the False Claims Act can complement—and, in some cases, even substitute for—
those remedies.”).
108. See Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns That Do Not Shoot To Foreign
Staplers: Has The Supreme Court's Materiality Standard Under Escobar
Provided Clarity For The Health Care Industry About Fraud Under The False
Claims Act?, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1247 (2018) (describing the second major
holding in Escobar).
109. Id. at 1258.
110. Id. at 1275; David Kwok, Is Vagueness Choking The White-Collar
Statute?, 53 GA. L. REV. 495, 527 (2019).
111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (specifying the pleading standard for claims of
fraud).
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of an FCA suit where the party committing the fraud clearly has
more information than the plaintiff might.112 Nevertheless, the
materiality of the false claim is an essential element of a violation
of the False Claims Act and must be adequately pled.113 Further,
while materiality can be a factually intensive inquiry, the Supreme
Court expressly rejected the idea that the materiality or
immateriality of a false claim was not addressable in a motion to
dismiss at the pleading stage.114 As demonstrated in the next
section, lower courts have taken this advice from note six of the
opinion to heart.
2. The Reality in the Courtroom is Routine Summary Dismissal
The potential effect of the heightened materiality standard
was not immediately apparent to the circuit courts. The Fourth
Circuit explained “[i]f Universal Health controlled our decisions on
materiality in these appeals, it is unclear what the impact might
be” and “the applicable materiality test [from Universal Health]
verges toward a subjective standard.”115 Nevertheless, applications
of the heightened standard in the circuit courts suggested strict
enforcement of the demanding standard.116 Perhaps more
worryingly to parties on either side, circuit court decisions so far
suggest a possible circuit split on the standard.117
112. See TIMOTHY S. JOST & SHARON DAVIES, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD
ABUSE 334 (2002-03 ed. 2002) (“[C]ourts have permitted some flexibility in
pleading . . . information in these cases is less available to the plaintiff than to
the defendant . . . [t]he court may at its discretion permit the plaintiff, however,
to amend . . . when 9(b) issues are raised.”).
113. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.
Ct. 1989, 2002 n.6 (2016) (“[P]laintiffs must also plead their claims with
plausibility and particularity under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9(b)
by, for instance, pleading facts to support allegations of materiality.”).
114. See id. (“We reject [the] assertion that materiality is too fact intensive
for courts to dismiss False Claims Act cases on a motion to dismiss or at summary
judgment.”).
115. See United States v. Raza, 876 F.3d 604, 620–21 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding
the heightened materiality of the FCA did not apply to criminal prosecutions).
116. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Dresser v. Qualium, No. 12-cv-01745, 2016
WL 3880763, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016) (granting defendant’s motion based
on a failure to establish materiality on the grounds the government did not
explain why the alleged noncompliance was material).
117. See Farringer supra note 108, at 1243–44 (describing the circuit splits
AND
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In a strict application of the materiality standard, the Fifth
Circuit held that a failure to obtain expressly required engineering
approvals during construction of a floating oil facility was not
material to support a claim.118 Despite the apparent seriousness of
failing to obtain required engineering approvals for a floating oil
platform, the court found that the government’s continued
approvals after learning of the failure failed the materiality
standard.119 This opinion has seen extensive examination by the
government contract’s defense bar that sees the heightened
materiality as a welcome reprieve from False Claims Act
litigation.120 The Third Circuit also adopted the view that
continued government payments after discovery of noncompliance
or fraud are essentially dispositive of immateriality when it
dismissed a complaint where the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) had consistently reimbursed claims with
knowledge of noncompliance as well as previous notification to the
Federal Drug Administration (FDA) and DOJ, which chose not to
act on the false statements.121
The Fifth and Third Circuits were not alone in their strict
application of the new standard. The Seventh Circuit used
heightened materiality to affirm the granting of a defendant’s
summary judgment motion on the grounds that noncompliance
was not material even where it would establish the government’s
right to refuse payment because the relator “offered no evidence
that the government’s decision to pay would likely or actually have
been different had it known of . . . [the] alleged noncompliance
with [the] regulations.”122 The Circuit for the District of Columbia
as well found that a claim did not establish materiality when it
was not clear that the government actually used fraudulent data
over interpretation of the FCA).
118. See Abbot v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2017)
(holding failure to obtain engineering approvals not sufficiently material).
119. See id. at 388 (ruling that the district court had correctly granted
summary judgement).
120. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 102, at 3–4 (including a discussion of
the Abbot decision).
121. See United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 489–
90 (3d. Cir. 2017) (holding continued government payments after the government
was knowledge indicated immateriality).
122. See United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir.
2016) (holding failure to comply with applicable regulations not material).
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for payment; even though it was not disputed that fraudulent data
had been submitted.123 These decisions are even more strict than
the Fifth and Third Circuits’ approach in that they found
immateriality based on speculation that the government would
still pay the claims.124
While there is apparent potential for a circuit split, it is also
true that circuits’ applying a more plaintiff-friendly, or even less
motion-to-dismiss-friendly, approach are in the clear minority.125
The Sixth Circuit reversed a trial court’s granting of a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of regulatory noncompliance.126 The circuit
court reasoned that the discussion of immaterial regulatory
noncompliance by the Supreme Court did not apply because the
regulation in question was both an express condition and a
mechanism of fraud prevention.127 The court considered the
government’s past payments to offer no support in either direction
and—in direct opposition to the Fifth Circuit—expressly
overturned the trial court’s inferences that government inaction
pointed significantly to immateriality.128
Perhaps most uniquely the Ninth Circuit has largely taken the
approach that the Supreme Court’s decision did not change
anything.129 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, the Ninth
Circuit had looked to its own precedent—United States ex rel.
Hendow v. University of Phoenix130—when examining cases
123. See United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 848 F.3d 1027, 1032
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding relator did not adequately plead material facts).
124. See id. at 1034 (finding immateriality based on the speculative and
generic nature of the statement); see also United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd.,
840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that speculation was insufficient to
survive summary judgement).
125. See Farringer, supra note 108, at 1263 (stating that Escobar has changed
the landscape such that the new standard is dismissing more cases than would
have been prior).
126. See United States ex rel. Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., 892
F.3d 822, 836 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding relator’s pleading of regulatory
non-compliance).
127. See id. at 836 (emphasizing the regulations role in fraud prevention).
128. See id. at 834 (“[T]he government's payment of the claims irrelevant to
the question of materiality.”).
129. See United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Inst., 909 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th
Cir. 2018) (stating that their existing precedent was not irreconcilable with the
reasoning or theory of Escobar).
130. See United States of America ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phx., 461 F.3d

MATERIAL LIVES

295

sounding in the False Claims Act. 131 As that court explained, “[W]e
view Escobar as creating a ‘gloss’ on the analysis of materiality.
But the four basic elements of a False Claims Act claim, set out in
Hendow, remain valid.”132 While other circuits at least all agreed
that materiality was a heavy burden on the plaintiff’s pleading, the
Ninth Circuit continues to place the burden instead on the
defendant reasoning that “[d]efendant has not established as a
matter of law that its violations of the [regulation] were
immaterial.”133
3. The Supreme Court Has Refused to Clarify the Escobar
Standard
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court has received
numerous requests to clarify “unprincipled confusion as to when a
false claim is sufficiently material to impose liability.”134 For at
least the third time in the past two years a petitioner requested
that the Court clarify the Escobar materiality requirement.135
These petitions have come from the 5th, 9th, and 10th circuits.136
V. The Need for Qui Tam-False Claims Act Oversight in Medicaid
The need for qui tam actions to prosecute Medicaid fraud is of
special importance.137 In the first part of this section, the reality of
1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding the essential elements of FCA liability to be
(1) a false statement or fraudulent course of conduct, (2) made with scienter, (3)
that was material, causing (4) the government to pay out money or forfeit moneys
due).
131. See United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Inst., 909 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th
Cir. 2018) (holding the that the Hendow elements were not affected by the
decision in Escobar).
132. See id. at 1020 (stating that the Hendow elements remain valid).
133. See id. (applying the Escobar standards of materiality).
134. Daniel Seiden, Supreme Court Passes on Materiality Issue in Medicare
Fraud
Case,
BLOOMBERG
LAW
(Oct.
5,
2020,
9;43
AM),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/XEUCI1G0000000 (last
visited Nov. 11, 2020) [perma.cc/6AJS-WC4V].
135. See id. (listing denied cert petitions since January 2019).
136. See id. (providing a summary of recent cert petitions).
137. See Beck, supra note 30, at 562 (describing the nexus between FCA
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inadequate government oversight is discussed both in terms of
simple documentation as well as government prosecution.
Moreover, this section discusses the current DOJ policies, which
emphasize the importance of accessibility to justice and the court
process where the government is less likely to intervene to bring
the full resources of the United States government against those
who would perpetrate fraud through a system designed to benefit
our most vulnerable.138
A. The Government is Incapable of Adequately Prosecuting or
Even Estimating Fraud in Medicaid
In testimony provided to the United States Senate, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that Medicaid
represented $596 billion in federal spending in 2017. 139 The GAO
further testified that an estimated $36.7 billion of those payments
were improper.140 The GAO also testified that Medicaid data
reporting was inadequate to effectuate proper oversight.141 This is
a significant weakness given the GAO’s recommendation that
“CMS still needs to conduct a fraud risk assessment and
implement a risk-based antifraud strategy for Medicaid.”142
CMS itself, however, estimates that the Medicaid improper
payment rate in 2019 rose to 14.9%, which amounts to improper
payments in the amount of $57.36 billion dollars. 143 The problem,
however, is so systemic that even those numbers are themselves
claims and qui tam suits).
138. See infra section V.A.
139. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-687T, MEDICAID: CMS
HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ADDRESS PROGRAM RISKS BUT FURTHER ACTIONS NEEDED TO
STRENGTHEN PROGRAM INTEGRITY 1 (2018) (estimating Medicaid expenditures in
fiscal year 2017).
140. See id. (exemplifying the challenges of overseeing the program at a
federal level).
141. See id. (stating the need for improved program oversight).
142. Id.
143. See 2019 Estimated Improper Payment Rates for Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) Programs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.
(Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/2019-estimatedimproper-payment-rates-centers-medicare-medicaid-services-cms-programs (last
visited Feb. 20, 2020) (using a table to display the change in improper payment
rates) [perma.cc/YP3W-HXWC].
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flawed and incapable of tracking well-executed fraud.144 CMS
offers the following disclaimer before disclosing the 2019 improper
payment rate:
[I]mproper payment rates are not necessarily indicat[ive] of
fraud . . . . OMB guidance states that when an agency’s review
is unable to discern whether a payment was proper as a result
of insufficient or missing documentation, this payment should
be considered an improper payment . . . . However, if the
documentation [of a fraudulent claim] had been submitted and
properly maintained, then the payments may have been
determined to be proper.145

CMS does note the rate captures some fraud, but it offers no
estimate of what that proportion is to the total it might be nor how
it might be found in the data.146
CMS notes that the 2018 to 2019 improper payment rates are
not comparable due to the shifting nature of the data’s collection
by sampling of seventeen states at a time with the District of
Columbia.147 Beneath that, however, CMS reveals that it is
potential fraud itself which is corrupting the data through
“[n]on-compliance with newer requirements for provider
revalidation . . . [and] [c]ontinued non-compliance with provider
enrollment, screening, and National Provider Information
requirements.”148 The data that should be used to track potential
fraud in Medicaid has been rendered potentially incapable of doing
so by the sheer rate of non-compliance which may be indicative of
fraud.149
The government is at least aware of the problem’s scope. The
GAO’s report to Congressional committees in March of 2019
continues to list Medicaid program integrity as a “high risk

144. See id. (outlining the imperfections in data about improper payment
rates).
145. Id.
146. See id. (“A smaller proportion of improper payments are payments that
should not have been made or should have been made in different amounts and
are considered a monetary loss to the government.”).
147. See id. (“[I]mproper payment rates increased between FY 2018 and 2019,
these results are not comparable as the measurement as changed dramatically.”).
148. Id.
149. See id (listing non-compliance as one of the factors that led to an increase
in improper payment rates).
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area.”150 That high risk is due to the previously discussed data
issues as well as the prevalence of improper payments and
appropriate use of funds.151 While the GAO does accept that CMS
has partially met goals to estimate and address fraud, the auditors
note that the efforts described are not even capable of adequately
reflecting the nature of the risks.152 Overall “more than 70 of [the
GAO’s] recommendations related to Medicaid remain open, and
several major steps remain to improve Medicaid program
integrity.”153
More worrisome is that as Medicaid shifts to managed care—
administered by Managed Care Organizations (MCOs)—CMS
oversight of those organizations is fundamentally inadequate,
given that there is no medical review of services purported to be
performed.154 Examining the issue almost twenty years ago,
Malcolm Sparrow pointed out “[f]raud perpetrators understand the
dynamics of false claims extremely well . . . They bill their lies
correctly.”155 Administrative review alone ensures that “[t]here is
no reason . . . to believe they will uncover false claims whenever
false documentation is supplied to match the false claims.” 156 In
one example from 1998 Senate testimony, a provider who admitted
to committing fraud revealed how easy the administrative-focused
review of fraud was to circumvent.157 Finally, the effect of the shift
to MCOs and the accompanying fraud “may be more dangerous to

150. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-157SP, HIGH-RISK SERIES:
SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED TO ACHIEVE GREATER PROGRESS ON HIGH-RISK
AREAS 250 (2019).
151. See id. (“Our recent work highlights oversight challenges in three areas:
[I]mproper payments, appropriate use of program dollars, and data.”).
152. See id. at 251 (“However, efforts to date do not ensure CMS can estimate
an improper payment rate for managed care that reflects all program risks.”).
153. Id. at 250.
154. See id. at 252 (“CMS’s estimates of MCO improper payments do not
include a medical review of services or reviews of MCO records or data, which
likely minimizes the appearance of program risks in Medicaid managed care.”).
155. See MALCOLM K. SPARROW, LICENSE TO STEAL: HOW FRAUD BLEEDS
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 84 (Updated ed., 2000).
156. Id. at 92.
157. See id. at 92–93 (“In April 1998 . . . Watts, quickly figured out that if all
the government ever did was compare claims submitted with the medical
documentation provided . . . all he needed to do, when asked, was fabricate
documents to match.”).
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human health than the types of fraud familiar under traditional
fee-for-service arrangements.”158
The inability to pursue fraud adequately is not limited to
CMS.159 The measure of DOJ suits leading to recovery alone
further suggests that initiating civil enforcement is too large a task
for the department. The DOJ reported that in 2018 suits pursued
under the False Claims Act concerning Health and Human
Services, which includes Medicaid, led to settlements and
judgments of over $2.5 billion.160 The vast majority of those
recoveries, however, were launched by qui tam actions and
constitute more than $1.9 billion, or 77.4% of the total.161 The vast
majority of the United States’ recovery for fraud perpetrated in the
health care field was obtained by qui tam actions prior to
government involvement.162
It is also not true that qui tam actions are the aggregation of
small frauds while the DOJ pursues larger fraudulent programs.163
On January 22, 2019, Walgreens announced a $269.2 million
settlement of two qui tam FCA cases. 164 The relators alleged in one
case that Walgreens was overcharging the Medicaid program for
insulin provided to beneficiaries and in the other that they received
discounts which were not disclosed to the government.165 The fraud
158. See MALCOLM K. SPARROW, FRAUD CONTROL IN THE HEALTH CARE
INDUSTRY: ASSESSING THE STATE OF THE ART, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 9
(Dec. 1998).
159. See CIV. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD STATISTICS-OVERVIEW: OCTOBER
1, 1986 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2018 3 (2019) (totaling qui tam suit recoveries).
160. Id.
161. See id. (offering a total of fraud case recoveries from the spreadsheet).
162. See id. (indicating that larger numbers of recovery for fraud was obtained
by qui tam actions than those in which the government intervened).
163. See Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certification, Interpretation, and the
Quest for Fraud That “Counts” Under the False Claims Act, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV.
1811, 1816 (2017) (stating that qui tam cases are filed by a wide range of
individuals and entities).
164. See Johnathan Stempel, Walgreens pays $269.2 Million to Settle U.S.
Civil
Fraud
Lawsuits,
REUTERS
(Jan.
22,
2019,
5:04
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-walgreens-boots-settlement/walgreens-pays269-2-million-to-settle-u-s-civil-fraud-lawsuits-idUSKCN1PG2PF (last visited
Feb. 19, 2020) (“Walgreens Boots Alliance Inc will pay $269.2 million to settle two
whistleblower lawsuits accusing it of civil fraud for overbilling federal healthcare
programs over a decade.”) [perma.cc/DR4D-SB3C].
165. See id. (describing the nature of the two lawsuits).
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perpetrated on Medicaid was so large that “46 states and D.C. have
joined with the Federal government” as parties to one of the
lawsuits.166 Despite the immense scope and scale, “the [first]
investigation resulted from a qui tam action originally filed in
2012.”167 The second investigation originated with “[t]wo
pharmacists . . . [and] insulin pens in July 2015” who also filed a
qui tam complaint.168 In cases of legally proven, admitted, or
settled fraud, the government is overwhelmingly relying on citizen
relators rather than government agencies.169
VI. Medicaid Fraud Inherently Affects and Disadvantages the
Most Vulnerable Communities
This section is the most important of this Note. While
Medicaid definitionally benefits our most vulnerable, it is
important to document and explicitly talk about what that means.
The first section discusses the realities of how Medicaid primarily
benefits not simply the poor, but especially administers social
justice solutions to racial minorities and those with disabilities.
The discussion then moves to discuss how Medicaid fraud is not a
benign threat or simply a taxpayer issue—it results in real
physical danger to those who use the program for medical care.
Finally, a brief discussion is included of the systemic and
existential threat posed by Medicaid fraud to the very existence of
Medicaid.
A. Demographic Overviews Reveal Minorities and Disabled
Individuals Are Disproportionately Affected
166. See Jorge E. Perez-Casellas, Managing Director, Ankura, Puerto Rico
False Claims Act: Perspectives and Implications to your Compliance Program,
Presentation at HCCA San Juan Regional Compliance Conference (May 16, 2019)
(available in HCCA archives) (detailing the national reach of Walgreens
fraudulent dealings).
167. Id.
168. See id. (filing complaint by two pharmacist relators concerning insulin
pens).
169. See Krause, supra note 163, at 1816 (positing that the qui tam
mechanism ensures that FCA cases will be filed by a wide range of individuals
and entities other than federal prosecutors).
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Medicaid by nature is offered to the most at-risk members of
the community for whom other health care options are not
realistically available, and as a result Medicaid fraud is
necessarily an issue for impoverished communities. 170 Mandatory
eligibility for Medicaid is limited to low-income families, pregnant
women, children, and individuals already qualified for social
welfare under the Supplemental Security Income program.171 In
addition, there are some individuals eligible for Medicaid who—
despite exceeding the poverty threshold—have medical needs so
extensive that they are effectively rendered impoverished by the
extent of their care or treatment.172 As a result, the quality of
Medicaid care is an issue that unavoidably affects the most
vulnerable communities in America given that they must already
be living in absolute or effective poverty to even qualify for
program participation.173
Medicaid fraud ought to be considered a racial justice issue
given the disproportionate representation of minorities among
Medicaid beneficiaries.174 For the fiscal year 2013, white
populations made up the plurality of Medicaid enrollees at 40%;
however, the other 60% was composed of 21% African Americans,
25% Hispanic Americans, and 14% other racial groups. 175 During
the same time period the overall racial make-up of the United
170. See Eligibility, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/eligibility/index.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2020) (citing low income families as beneficiaries of Medicaid) [perma.cc/Y9KFKDUL].
171. See id. (“Low-income families, qualified pregnant women and children,
and individuals receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are examples of
mandatory eligibility groups.”).
172. See id. (“Once an individual’s incurred expenses exceed the difference
between the individual’s income and the state’s medically needy income level (the
“spenddown” amount), the person can be eligible for Medicaid.”).
173. See id. (listing the groups of individuals who qualify for program
participation).
174. See John V. Jacobi, Special Feature: Medicaid Matters: Medicaid
Evolution for the 21st Century, 102 KY. L. J. 357, 360 (2013/2014) (stating that
racial minorities are among a large percent of Medicaid enrollees).
175. See Medicaid Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-enrollment-byraceethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location
%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (providing a
searchable database of Medicaid demographics) [perma.cc/WE5H-SWGA].
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States indicated whites represented 63% of the population, African
Americans 12%, Hispanic Americans 17%, and all other groups
8%.176 This indicates that minority groups, traditionally
economically disadvantaged by societal factors too broad to be
addressed here, are accordingly disproportionally represented in
the Medicaid enrollee numbers.
Moreover, Medicaid fraud is also a significant issue for
disability advocates.177 For the last year in which data is available,
the number of Medicaid enrolled children who qualified through a
disability pathway totaled almost 1.6 million.178 Individuals
deemed categorically eligible for Medicaid include a number of
adult disability groups including: “disabled individuals in 209(b)
states;” “disabled individuals eligible in 1973;” “working disabled;”
and “qualified disabled” as mandated by sections of the Social
Security Act and other government regulation.179
B. Medicaid Fraud Creates Acute Standard of Care Issues Which
Can Kill or Injure the Very Beneficiaries Medicaid is Supposed to
Save

176. See Populations Distribution by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/distribution-byraceethnicity/?currentTimeframe=5&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location
%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (providing a
searchable database of demographics for the entire population) [perma.cc/N3H8KMXW].
177. See Medicaid Enrollees by Enrollment Group, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/distribution-of-medicaid-enrolleesby-enrollmentgroup/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%2
2sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Sept. 28, 2020) (displaying total
enrollment numbers for people with disabilities) [perma.cc/TA3N-LKXE].
178. See Medicaid Enrollment of Children Qualifying Through a disability
Pathway,
KAISER
FAM.
FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/stateindicator/medicaid-enrollment-of-children-qualifying-through-a-disabilitypathway/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,
%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (displaying total
enrollment numbers for adolescent disabled Medicaid beneficiaries)
[perma.cc/HQ3Y-WJCM].
179. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., LIST OF MEDICAID
ELIGIBILITY GROUPS: MANDATORY CATEGORICALLY NEEDY 1–2 (2019) (listing the
eligibility groups for categorically needy groups and the corresponding Social
Security Act and CFR citations).

MATERIAL LIVES

303

The social justice implications of Medicaid fraud should not
come as a shock. The unique impact of Medicaid fraud on
impoverished racial minorities is demonstrated in the very case
that serves as the basis of this Note. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Escobar ultimately began with the tragic death of Yarushka
Rivera.180 Yarushka’s parents sought only to help their teenage
daughter receive counseling services to resolve behavioral
issues.181 Yarushka was a young woman of color, living in poverty,
and had she not died after having been wrongfully prescribed, she
may have received a diagnosis entitling her to disability
protections.182 The danger of Medicaid fraud perpetrated on
America’s most vulnerable communities could scarcely find a
better example than the young woman whose tragic death
launched the very case and subsequent Court opinion that now
makes it easier to perpetrate the type of fraud that led to her
death.183
Yarushka Rivera’s story is likely not an anomaly. Data
collected by the Kaiser Family Foundation suggest that the rate of
Medicaid beneficiaries receiving anti-psychotic medications—the
very medication type that caused the seizures which killed
Yarushka—is more than four times the overall rate in the
country.184 While there may be a higher incidence of mental health
disorders among the impoverished, studies suggest that the
current Medicaid payment model incentivizes providers to
administer services as “efficiently” as possible—often at the cost of
quality of care.185 Yarushka’s case illustrates providers’ efforts to
provide services at the highest profit margin possible by sometimes
employing individuals who work at a lower labor rate than their

180. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136
S. Ct. 1989, 1997 (2016) (describing the details of Yarushka’s death).
181. See id. at 1997 (detailing how Yarushka became a patient at Arbour).
182. See supra Subpart III.A (detailing the facts of the Escobar decision).
183. See supra Subpart III.A (explaining the details of the Escobar decision).
184. See LIZ BORKOWSKI ET. AL, IMPACTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING ON
HEALTHCARE SERVICES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 7 (2012) (“[T]he national
average percentage of Medicaid beneficiaries receiving antipsychotics for all
states was 5.4% . . . [i]n the general population, an estimated 1.2% of the US
population filled antipsychotic prescriptions.”).
185. See Sparrow, supra note 158, at 7–8 (explaining the dangers of the
current CMS payment system which incentivize fraud).
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qualified peers and may lack the requisite credentials to do the
very jobs they were assigned.186
One of the most striking aspects of these acute failures in
Medicaid-provided care is that the most accurate statistic
available is the settlement and judgment rate of FCA suits
concerning the Department of Health Services.187 Those statistics
alone, however, have serious shortcomings as indicators of acute
mistreatment.188 That number includes a variety of cases which
involve overbilling for otherwise adequate products, and there is
no methodical break down of when false claims in medical services
cross the line from price fraudulent to the life-threatening fraud
which killed Yarushka.189
Furthermore, the demonstrated inability of the government to
track Medicaid fraud will only further incentivize those who wish
to engage in fraud.190 Even before Escobar weakened the qui tam
provision, studies suggested that “[o]ne of the markers of a
physician’s willingness to ‘game’ program rules is whether more
than 25% of a physician’s patients are on Medicaid.” 191 In other
words, providers are more willing to engage in Medicaid fraud
when they have large Medicaid practices, only compounding the
impact of their willingness to submit false claims. This is a further
systemic issue for Medicaid funds in any given year.192

186. See Universal Health Serv.’s, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.
Ct. 1989, 1997 (2016) (clarifying that only one of the professionals who had
treated Yarushka was licensed).
187. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 160 (providing statistics of false
claims recovery in suits concerning the DHHS).
188. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 160 (failing to include acute
mistreatment not captured by the statistics).
189. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 160 (lacking analysis of the type of
fraud that occurred in Escobar).
190. See Sparrow, supra note 155, at 102–05 (discussing the incentives of
fraud where government enforcement is lacking in Medicaid).
191. See Matthew K. Wynia, Physician Manipulation of Reimbursement Rules
for Patients: Between a Rock and Hard Place, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1858, 1863
(2000) (analyzing the rates of physician manipulation of reimbursement rate).
192. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 160 (showing the figures reported by
the DOJ in determining allocation of Medicaid resources).
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C. Medicaid Fraud Has a Chronic, Systemic Impact Which
Imperils Even Those Medicaid Beneficiaries Receiving Proper
Care
DOJ recovery statistics are an indicator of the provable
drawdown of the finite resources available to Medicaid.193
Appropriations for Medicaid equaled almost $420 billion in fiscal
year 2019.194 Even with such large outlays, the borders of
Medicaid’s capability to adequately serve their legally mandated
beneficiaries have been exposed due to financial considerations.195
In Puerto Rico, for example, funding shortfalls could “trigger
coverage losses of one-third to one-half” of the current Medicaid
beneficiaries.196 While these shortfalls in territorial Medicaid
funding are not alleged to have been caused by fraud, these
examples serve to present the reality that the exhaustion of
Medicaid funding is a real possibility and that the result is a loss
of medical treatment for beneficiaries.197
The danger to the current Medicaid appropriations from fraud
is not the only funding concern associated with ongoing Medicaid
fraud.198 Every year, appropriations for Medicaid are derived from
the political machinations of Congress.199 Ongoing fraud in
Medicaid consistently draws the attention of a number of
193. See, e.g., Kevin D. Williamson, The Facts about Medicaid Fraud, NAT’L
REV. (Sep. 11, 2016 8:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/09/medicaidfraud-staggering-cost-140-billion/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (stating that
improper payments under Medicaid are so common that DHHS that it accounted
for 12% of total Medicaid spending) [perma.cc/W467-7PLU].
194. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.’S, FY-2020 BUDGET IN BRIEF 98
(2020) (charting the total net outlays of legislative proposals for Medicaid in
2019).
195. See Robin Rudowits, et al., Medicaid Financing Cliff: Implications for
the Health Care Systems in Puerto Rico and USVI, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (MAY 2,
2019),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-financing-cliffimplications-for-the-health-care-systems-in-puerto-rico-and-usvi/ (last visited
Feb. 21, 2020) (detailing the Medicaid financial crisis faces in U.S. territories)
[perma.cc/N5W3-WCY7].
196. See id. (estimating potential coverage losses due to funding shortfalls).
197. See id. (highlighting the financing challenges following natural disasters
in U.S. territories).
198. See Rapperport, infra note 202 (reporting the possibility of Medicare cuts
under the current administration).
199. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 194, at 12 (recognizing
that congress has the authority to implement more sweeping changes).
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publications and organizations who use it as political leverage to
argue for the diminishment or end of Medicaid entirely.200 Fraud
serves as effective ammunition in the argument against the size
and expenditure of the Medicaid program even as the number of
uninsured children in the country rises for the first time in
years.201 The danger of ongoing fraud to the Medicaid system is
potentially existential in an easily foreseeable political
environment.202
VII. Resurrecting the False Claims Act’s Qui Tam Provision to
Combat Medicaid Fraud
The clearest path forward to making the False Claims Act
effective to combatting Medicaid fraud is to adopt the proven
strategy Congress has embraced in FCA’s past: Statutory
amendment.203 Congress has regularly amended the False Claims
Act in response to Court decisions in order to effectuate the
purpose of the act in changing legal and regulatory realities.204 The
False Claims Act currently defines materiality as “having the
natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the
payment or receipt of money or property.”205 In order to resurrect
the qui tam provision as an effective tool to combat fraud, preserve
Medicaid, and help safeguard our most vulnerable communities,
Congress should amend the False Claims Act’s materiality
definition to provide clarity that the decision of a government
agency to expressly designate terms as a condition of payment
should be considered automatically material in the courts.
200. See Williamson, supra note 193 (mischaracterizing Medicaid payment
data to case doubt on the validity of the program).
201. See Joan Alker & Lauren Roygardner, The Number of Uninsured
Children is on the Rise, GEO. U. CTR. FOR CHILD. & FAM., (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2019/10/29/the-number-of-uninsured-children-in-onthe-rise-acs/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (showing a rise of 400,000 more uninsured
children nationwide between 2016 and 2018) [perma.cc/QKA3-C4W7].
202. See, e.g., Alan Rappeport & Maggie Haberman, Trump Opens Possibility
of Making Medicare Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2020, at A20 (detailing the
potential for large cuts to Medicaid funding).
203. See supra Subpart II.A (outlining the history of the statute).
204. See supra Subpart II.A (detailing the history of statutory amendment in
response Supreme Court decisions).
205. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2018).
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In constructing this proposal, it is important to begin with why
a judicial framework alone will not re-effectuate the purpose of the
FCA after Escobar.206 It is possible that the Court could apply
previously utilized reasoning in other complex determinations;
however, that will also reveal fundamental flaws.207 Having found
the judicially available tools inadequate, this Note will offer a
statutory amendment to bring the FCA back to the original intent
of Congress.
A. The Status Quo Precludes an Adequate General Judicial
Framework of FCA Materiality
In the first instance, judicial adoption of a modified
materiality standard is likely impossible. The lower courts are
bound by the decision of the Supreme Court, which decisively
reasoned in Escobar: “[s]ection 3729(b)(4) defines materiality
using language that we have employed [previously] . . . . This
requirement descends from ‘common-law antecedents.’”208 The
Court did not discuss what the implications of these common law
antecedents are beyond offering citations to well respected legal
tracts.209 Paradoxically, the materiality standard the Court offered
excludes the black letter rule of the current Restatement on
Contracts, which allows for repudiation where express terms are
not satisfied.210 In a footnote, the Court comes the closest to
206. Cf. infra Section VII.A (explaining the inadequacy of the judicial
framework to re-effectuate the purpose of the FCA post-Escobar).
207. See infra Section VII.A (detailing the rationale for arguing that judicial
modification of the standard is insufficient).
208. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.
Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016) (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 769 (1988))
(noting in citation that this language’s application in immigration fraud is
considered identical by the Court).
209. See id. (explaining materiality through citations to R. Lord, Williston on
Contracts and the second restatements of torts and contracts respectively and
reciting their definitions).
210. Compare Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (“Nor is it sufficient for a finding of
materiality that the Government would have the option to decline to pay if it knew
of the defendant’s noncompliance.”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 253(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Where performances are to be exchanged under
an exchange of promises, one party’s repudiation of a duty to render performance
discharges the other party’s remaining duties to render performance.”).
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offering a succinct definition when it quotes Cardozo’s maxim that
materiality concerns those things that “went to the very essence of
the bargain.”211
The critical question, however, becomes what is “material”
under a statute that governs such a wide variety of contracts where
the only common feature is federal payment? The government has
arguably made a good faith effort to provide such a standard in
contractual express conditions of payment.212 Yet, the Supreme
Court has said that is not indicative of materiality.213 Lower courts
applying the new standard have found continued payments to be
an indicator.214 However, this ignores the reality that inspectors,
investigators, and the administrative payment structure are
frequently totally disconnected from each other.215 It is apparent
that efforts to approach materiality across the divergent fields
captured by the False Claims Act are hampered by the fixing of
materiality in common law antecedents.216 Nowhere is this more
apparent than in its application to the complexity of Medicaid
fraud.217
The judiciary has routinely found itself wanting of the precise,
technical expertise required for legal solutions to problems within
the policy-laden administrative sphere.218 The FCA far predates

211. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 n.5 (citing Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 257
N.Y. 393, 400 (1931)).
212. See id. at 514 (“The express and absolute language of the regulation in
question . . . constitute dispositive evidence of materiality.”) (citations omitted).
213. See supra Subpart III.B (explaining how express designations of
payment are not indicative of materiality according to the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Escobar).
214. See supra Subpart V.A (exploring the difficulties of compiling reliable
data, the complex nature of Medicaid administration, and inadequacy of the
“improper payment rate” to capture fraud).
215. See supra Section IV.B.2 (documenting lower courts application of the
Escobar materiality standard).
216. See generally, Escobar 136 S. Ct. at 1989 (holding that materiality under
the act is derived from demanding common law antecedents).
217. See supra Part III.B (establishing that the FCA incorporates the
heightened common law definition of materiality); see also supra Part VII
(arguing that amending the FCA materiality definition needs to be amended to
provide clarity).
218. See e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1997) (holding
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation as authoritative).
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the origination of what is now referred to as administrative law.219
From the Court’s perspective, the FCA does not implicate
administrative law at all, instead developing its foundations from
contract common law.220 This view wholly ignores the complex
administrative policy determinations that are the heart of
Medicaid’s existence.221 It also ignores the complex subject matter
of medical care organizations dealing with hundreds or thousands
of patients in at-risk communities.222 Finally, it totally fails to take
into account the inherent complexity of a program that is
administered under different regimes by each state, territory, and
the District of Columbia.223
Absent new express language to the contrary within the
statute, lower courts must abide by the Supreme Court’s
interpretation within Escobar.224 The Supreme Court previously
adopted a more flexible approach that may have been more
appropriate for the current realities of Medicaid fraud and the FCA
generally, but that decision’s reasoning has never been widely
considered and was obviously not part of the Court’s reasoning in
Escobar.225 Of relevant difference between that decision and the
FCA generally, however, is that it concerned an antitrust issue
over which Congress had specifically delegated its authority to an

219. See Malcom J. Harkins III, The Ubiquitous False Claims Act: The
Incongruous Relationship Between.a Civil War Era Fraud Statute and the Modern
Administrative State, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 131, 141 (2007)
(explaining that the rise of administrative law system postdates the FCA).
220. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.
Ct. 1989, 2002–03 (2016) (using common law sources to explain the materiality
requirement).
221. See supra Part II (outlining the history of the FCA’s revisions in
response to Supreme Court decisions considered contrary to the act’s intent).
222. See supra Part VI (arguing Medicaid fraud leaves patients at risk).
223. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEDICAID FUNDING FOR
THE TERRITORIES (2019) (outlining fundamental differences between state and
territorial governments’ administration of Medicaid).
224. See supra Part III.B (outlining the new standard set forth in Escobar).
225. See Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 289 (1973) (holding the
Seventh Circuit’s stay of proceedings until there is a commission ruling to be
appropriate) (“[P]roceedings should be stated until the [the commission] can pass
on the validity of respondents’ conduct . . . determination of whether the
[administrative body]’s rules were violated as petitioner claims or were followed
requires a factual determination within the special competence of the
Commission.”).
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agency.226 Despite the breadth of the Medicaid program, the
relevant federal agencies for its administration are incapable of
fully documenting the program and have no adjudicatory
powers.227 The solution might be found in the various state
Medicaid regulatory bodies; but, the potential impact of state
regulatory bodies in the enforcement of a federal regulation is
beyond the scope of this Note. 228 In either event, the controlling
decision for the lower courts, Escobar, makes no mention of this
reasoning.
B. A Statutory Amendment Will Allow for Reliable and Accurate
Materiality Determinations in FCA Suits
Given the practical impossibility of adopting a judicial
framework to remedy the material problem, the answer is for
Congress to amend the FCA’s materiality definition to give the
courts clear guidance. As discussed earlier this is the generally
accepted approach for adapting the FCA to present realities and
policy challenges over its more than a century-and-a-half
existence.229 This Note’s proposal, however, differs from previous
attempts in that it seeks to recognize the wide breadth of the FCA’s
covering all government contracts while also allowing for a
solution to the Medicaid-specific issues that are the focus here.230
This proposal allows for the government to choose between
materiality standards where appropriate. This crucially allows for
contracting agencies to select the appropriate standard and
provides notice to contractors on which standard they will face.
226. See id. at 307 (“Rather, we simply recognize that the Congress has
established a specialized agency that would determine [whether a statutory
provision] has been violated or that it has been followed.”).
227. See supra Subpart V.A (discussing the inability of CMS and DHHS to
document Medicaid fraud).
228. See, e.g., Medicaid Fraud Division, STATE OF N.J. OFF. OF THE STATE
COMPTROLLER, https://www.nj.gov/comptroller/divisions/medicaid/ (last visited
Feb. 21, 2020) (describing the work of the Medicaid Fraud Division of the Office
of the State Comptroller of New Jersey which could potentially offer its expert
guidance to courts considering the materiality of terms in FCA Medicaid suits)
[perma.cc/28Y3-36PV].
229. See supra Part II (outlining the history of the FCA’s revisions in response
to Supreme Court decisions considered contrary to the act’s intent).
230. See supra Parts V, VI (describing issues within the Medicaid system).
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This Note proposes that 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) should be
amended to include a new subsection while still leaving the
existing definition wholly intact. The amended section would read
as follows:
(4) Material
(A) The term “material” will be interpreted by the courts to
mean having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of
influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property; except
where subsection (B) is specified.
(B) When this subsection is specified as governing by the text of
the contract in question, “material” will be interpreted by courts
to mean all express terms and conditions of payment.

This amendment gives a court that is hearing an FCA suit explicit
guidance on the interpretative framework to use for the term
“material.” This somewhat unusual solution—in that it provides
two alternate materiality definitions in a single statute—creates a
number of advantages that overcome potential objections.
The FCA covers everything from the medical care of
vulnerable communities discussed in this Note to the building of
nuclear propulsion systems for the United States Navy.231 Few—if
any—statutes still in the United States Code cover such a huge
number of complex and disparate commercial issues. 232 This
reflects the reality that the FCA was enacted at a time when the
size and responsibilities taken on by the Federal government today
would have been unimaginable to the act’s original drafters.233
Some contracting agencies may want to continue contracting
under the holistic understanding of materiality of “common-law
antecedents” as interpreted by the Court in Escobar.234 An agency
may wish to do so as a result of negotiation, complexity making
231. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2018).
232. See Harkins, supra note 219, at 133 (“Federal appellate and trial courts
have struggled to apply the FCA in light of these changed
circumstances . . . tension between the Civil War era FCA and the modern
administrative state [is evident]. . . .”).
233. See Calfee & Crawell, supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing
the history of the FCA as originally enacted to capture defense procurement fraud
in 1863).
234. See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003 (2016) (interpreting the materiality
standard of the FCA as requiring a holistic and demanding standard).
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express terms impracticable, or for any other reason the
contracting official deems relevant.
This dual solution, however, also allows for the critical
automatic incorporation of express terms as material in Medicaid.
This advantage is especially useful in a program like Medicaid
where the federal contribution creates FCA liability, but the
express contract terms are predominantly the concern of the
administering state agency.235 By giving effect to the express terms
selected by the states the courts will also be respecting the realities
of varying state medical licensure statutes and the need for local
determinations.236 What amounts to the essence of the bargain
concerning a traveling general practitioner working in a remote
area of the Mountain West might be different from a specialized
out-patient clinic in a major metropolitan area.237 When the
proposed additional material definition is adopted, the decisions
particular to each community’s needs will be respected through
express contract terms.238 Furthermore, it is impracticable for even
a codification as large as the Federal Register to ever accurately
capture the detail and constant evolution of the medical field.239
That detail and responsiveness is more likely within the capability
of state regulators responsive to their local community.240
Moreover, this new section may allow for lower compliance
costs.241 By designating the express terms of the contract as
235. See Harkins, supra note 219, at 134 (“Hendow permits courts to decide
whether a claim is false or fraudulent based on whether a contractor was in
compliance with administrative requirements when it claimed payment from the
government.”).
236. See supra Part IV (arguing uncertainty about the scope of the FCA has
created challenges).
237. See supra Part VI (discussing systematic problems within Medicaid).
238. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136
S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (2016) (“The materiality standard is demanding.”).
239. See Harkins, supra note 219, at 134 (“Recent cases evidence the
difficulties experienced by courts and foreshadow even greater difficulties if the
tension between the Civil War era FCA and the modern administrative state is
not addressed and resolved.”).
240. See Medicaid Fraud Division, STATE OF N.J. OFF. OF THE STATE
COMPTROLLER, supra note 228 and accompanying text (describing the work of the
Medicaid Fraud Division of the Office of the State Comptroller of New Jersey
which could potentially offer its expert guidance to courts considering the
materiality of terms in FCA Medicaid suits).
241. See Harkins, supra note 219, at 165 (describing the prohibitive cost of
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material, there will be significantly less uncertainty requiring
legal counsel.242 The express terms will capture the Medicaid
provider’s potential for liability.243 Providers will have specific
notice of the contract terms that would be considered by a court to
be material in a potential FCA suit. This enhanced certainty and
the lower compliance costs will also effectuate an important
Medicaid policy goal: expanding the provider base.244 With clearer
compliance standards and lower compliance costs, existing
providers will be incentivized to fully participate in Medicaid
programs as well as expanding their existing footprints in heavily
Medicaid dependent communities.245 Medicaid will be more fully
capable of fulfilling its promise of delivering effective medical care
to our most vulnerable communities with such wider and effective
participation.246
C. The Clear Results of the Proposal’s Effect on a Hypothetical
FCA Suit
Suppose that a provider is administering treatments in an
out-patient clinic to an underprivileged community using
unlicensed staff according to state medical licensing standards.
The provider’s contract with the state Medicaid administering
agency specifies “in interpretation of this contract by a court in a
False Claims Act suit, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4)(B) will apply.”
Members of the community have been using the clinic with
defending an FCA action as a “bet the company cases” which are often settled as
a business judgement).
242. See id. at 160 (explaining the tremendous potential for liability under
the FCA if providers run afoul of the government).
243. See supra Part III (discussing Universal Health Serv.’s, Inc. v. United
States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1997 (2016)).
244. See John V. Jacobi, Mission and Markets in Healthcare: Protecting
Essential Community Providers for the Poor, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 1431, 1431–32
(1997) (“A decade ago, entrepreneurs saw Medicaid services, particularly in
primary or comprehensive care, as providing insufficient remunerative benefits
to be worthwhile . . . Out of religious or social mission, however, a cadre of
community health centers and community-oriented hospitals provided highquality, culturally sensitive care to these underserved communities.”).
245. See id. at 1437–38 (describing the general language and lack updating
to address this language within the Medicaid system).
246. See supra Part VI (discussing the value that Medicaid provides).
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unsatisfactory results when suddenly a young woman dies due to
a prescription signed by an unlicensed and unqualified
practitioner. The father of the young woman learns the staff is
unlicensed and wants to bring a qui tam suit to shut down the
clinic and the equivalent of punitive damages.247
The would-be relator will need to plead facts sufficient to
establish a claim for fraud under the federal rules. 248 Under the
current Escobar materiality test, the relator will need to obtain
significant information about the clinic’s operation and regulatory
know-how to satisfy the “demanding standard” pleading of
Escobar.249 The relator may find a competent legal aid counsellor,
qui tam specialist, or large law firm willing to take his case
pro-bono; but still, the filing will surely be delayed as the complex,
fact intensive complaint is drawn up. 250 Moreover, the relator’s
ancient legal right to proceed pro se is practically eliminated by
these realities.
Under the proposed language of the new section, the relator
will only need to allege what he already knows: the staff is
engaged in the unlicensed practice of medicine and receiving
federal Medicaid funds for doing so. The relator brings his suit with
a qui tam FCA complaint that may even be possible to bring pro
se. The Medicaid contract specifies the express term materiality
language of the new statutory language. The district court quickly
finds that Medicaid expressly requires practitioners receiving
payments be licensed by state authorities, and the clinic’s motion
to dismissed is denied.251 The DOJ intervenes and uses its full
247. Cf. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.
Ct. 1989 (2016) (comparing the facts of this hypothetical are similar to those
found).
248. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (establishing the particularity requirements of
pleading fraud).
249. See supra Subpart IV.B (exploring the application of the Escobar
standard in lower courts to dismiss FCA suits); see also supra note 100 and
accompanying text (describing the steps necessary to have a proper FCA claim).
250. See Harkins, supra note 219, at 165 (describing the prohibitive cost of
defending an FCA action as a “bet the company cases” which are often settled as
a business judgement).
251. The reality of how quickly a court can dispose of materiality when
express conditions of payment are automatically dispositive of materiality are
laid bare in the First Circuit opinion which preceded the Supreme Court’s opinion
and was noted earlier in this Note. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United
States ex rel. Escobar, 780 F.3d 504, 514 (“The express and absolute language of
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resources to prosecute the suit to the fullest extent of the law. The
relator receives his share of damages as granted by statute, which
he uses to help his family recover from the loss of their daughter.252
Even if the defendant appeals, the reviewing court will be able to
affirm the trial court’s determination easily instead of engaging in
a complex, holistic review of the finding of materiality.
Importantly, this explicit resolution also provides a clear
deterrence effect to other Medicaid providers in the area.253
Medicaid providers would be strongly disincentivized from
providing care that falls short of the express contractual
requirements. The standard of care is raised, and the physical and
mental health of a previously underserved community is improved.
The potential benefits of increased healthcare in underprivileged
communities are difficult to overstate and their discussion here is
beyond the scope of this Note, but it must suffice to point out that
wisdom of such a policy has underwritten Medicaid’s fifty-five-year
existence across administrations of both political parties,
presidents with differing goals, and Congressional appropriations
in economic climates both good and bad.
VIII. Conclusion
People want to know under what circumstances and how far
they will run the risk of coming against what is so much
stronger than themselves . . . . You can see very plainly that a
bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid
an encounter with the public force . . . . A man who cares
nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by
his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid
being made to pay money.254

the regulation in question . . . constitute dispositive evidence of materiality.”)
(citations omitted).
252. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2018) (establishing the award to the qui tam
plaintiff).
253. See generally Richard Craswell & John E, Calfee, Deterrence and
Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. L., ECON., & ORG.’S, no. 2 (Fall 1986) (detailing
the enhanced deterrence of clear and certain legal standards in complex
regulatory environments).
254. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
459 (1897).
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Medicaid was enacted to help provide medical care for our
most vulnerable communities.255 It has helped reinforce the social
contract and reaffirmed our commitment as a nation of working to
ensure that in this country poverty need not be a death penalty.
The False Claims Act was enacted to help win a war against
slavery.256 Today qui tam relators in Medicaid suits seek to use it
to help win a war against poverty and injustice effectuated by those
who would use fraud to rob them of adequate medical care.257
A statutory amendment reinstating the clear purpose and
intended effect of the act will once again turn Lincoln’s Law into a
powerful weapon against other common enemies of this country:
poverty and social injustice. By providing clear punishment for
those who would take advantage of our nation’s commitment to
those most vulnerable among us, the False Claims Act can once
again serve to deliver results and help achieve victory for a country
in what has been its longest war.

255. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of
Medicaid).
256. See Harkins, supra note 219, at 139 (“The FCA is a Civil War era
statute . . . .”).
257. See supra Part VII (arguing that the qui tam provision is a means to
combat fraud in Medicaid).

